Washington’s response to Sudan’s ongoing war has hit a deadlock after more than three years. Recently, the US pressured Sudan’s armed forces (SAF) to agree to an unconditional ceasefire that would halt the conflict and ensure critical aid access.
At the United Nations General Assembly in New York, US officials focused their efforts almost entirely on the SAF, believing that sufficient pressure would force the army to abandon its mission against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—a militia supported regionally yet accused of multiple genocides. Despite this, the RSF has been seen as the “more cooperative party” in diplomatic discussions.
The US has relied heavily on sanctions, beginning with extensive measures under past administrations, which should have illustrated that Sudan’s regime can endure long-term pressure. Recent sanctions against SAF military procurement networks and attempts to impose a countrywide arms embargo have had limited impact, particularly given the lack of support from the UN Security Council, where any expansion of the embargo faces a probable Russian veto.
Last week, Washington took a provocative step, linking General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s attendance at the assembly to his signing of the US’s ceasefire proposal. Such tactics risk reflecting more on US frustrations with the diplomatic stalemate than on the army’s unwillingness to negotiate.
Since first proposing a ceasefire prior to last year’s UN assembly, Washington’s efforts have stalled due to both sides’ reluctance to sign agreements they fear would allow their opponents to regroup. Notably, the RSF stands to gain by formalising its control over vast regions of Sudan, while the SAF argues it is striving for national unity.
The US Department of State recently stated that neither warring faction offers legitimate governance, a claim that could alienate both sides further and indicate a shift towards seeking regime change rather than a peaceful resolution. This approach risks isolating Washington among other countries advocating for a stable and lasting peace in Sudan.
Additionally, nations such as Saudi Arabia expressed disappointment in the US’s missed diplomatic opportunity, which could have allowed al-Burhan to hear calls for peace from other leaders. Overall, the US appears to be repeating past mistakes by assuming that diplomatic pressure alone will yield positive outcomes on the battlefield.
As it stands, Washington’s isolation has mirrored back onto itself. Engaging both sides remains crucial—not just for restoring its diplomatic coalition but also for alleviating the humanitarian crisis in Sudan.
